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Abstract 
We explore the relationship between human migration and OECD’s Foreign Direct Investment 
(FDI) using a gravity equation enriched with variables that account for complex-network effects. 
Based on a panel data analysis, we find a strong positive correlation between the migration network 
and the FDI network, which can be mostly explained by countries’ economic/demographic sizes 
and geographical distance. We highlight the existence of a stronger positive FDI relationship in 
pairs of countries that are more central in the migration network. Both intensive and extensive 
forms of centrality are FDI enhancing. Illuminating this result, we show that bilateral FDI between 
any two countries is further affected positively by the complex web of ‘third party’ 
corridors/migration stocks of the international migration network. Our findings are consistent 
whether we consider bilateral FDI and bilateral migration figures, or we focus on the outward FDI 
and the respective inward migration of the OECD countries. 
Keywords: FDI; migration; graph theory; networks; complex systems. 
JEL: B00, B41, C13, F2
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1 Introduction 
During the past decades there was a huge flow of people, capital and knowledge around the world, 
which can be mainly attributed to human migration across borders and Foreign Direct Investment 
(FDI). And while throughout the literature it has been of major interest to explore the mechanisms 
of globalization, little attention has been paid in answering the question of whether immigration is 
related to FDI. As we will discuss in the next section, only a small part of literature has explored 
so far possible links between FDI and migration, suggesting that cross-border capital flows are 
affected by bilateral migration. As argued, the migration of people brings to the destination country 
factors of production, like capital and labor, but also a social network connected to immigrants’ 
origin country. These social networks may lower potential barriers to international investment, as 
immigrants possess crucial information about the structure of the local market, the preferences, as 
well as the business ethics and the commercial codes. This knowledge can be proved invaluable 
for overcoming many informational and contractual barriers, leading to stimulated investment 
activities across national boundaries. 
Whereas previous studies have focused on migrants within a single country, this work analyzes 
migration and FDI between many countries. The paper brings together a wide range of bilateral 
migration, FDI positions, geopolitical, demographic, economic, and socioeconomic data for 34 
OECD and 185 partner countries, covering three five-year periods that span from 1995 to 2010, 
and investigates the correlation between the international migration network and the international 
FDI network. More precisely, the current paper contributes to the existing literature by 
investigating the topological properties of the OECD’s bilateral FDI network and the OECD’s 
bilateral migration network. Considering a complex-network perspective we study the correlation 
patterns of the two networks. We follow Fagiolo and Mastrorillo (2014), as well as Sgrignoli et al. 
(2015), who explore similar issues using a trade perspective instead of FDI. We fit gravity models 
of bilateral FDI where we introduce centrality measures of the international migration network as 
explanatory variables. Our main hypothesis is that bilateral FDI is positively affected by the 
corresponding pair of countries’ centrality in the migration network. 
In our analysis, we first scout for similarities between the two networks by comparing links, 
topological structures and node statistics, finding strong correlations which can be mostly 
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explained by countries’ economic, demographic and geographical differences. Next, we 
specifically explore whether pairs of countries that are more central in the migration network 
foreign invest more. Thus, we add migration-network variables in our gravity regression equations 
of bilateral FDI stocks/positions in order to control for countries’ network-centralization and the 
intensity of ‘third-party’ migration origins. Confirming the results of the previous literature, we 
find that the networks of international migration and bilateral FDI are strongly and positively 
correlated, and such correlation can be mostly explained by countries’ economic/demographic 
sizes and geographical distance. More interestingly, we find that centrality in the international 
migration network boosts bilateral FDI between any two countries, and this result is further 
enhanced by countries’ relative embeddedness in the complex web of corridors making up the 
network of international human migration. Overall, we find that bilateral FDI between any two 
countries is not only affected by the presence of migrants from either countries but also by the 
number of their total inward-migration links. In other words, FDI between any two countries 
increases due to their binary connectivity in the international migration network, and in turn, due 
to a higher number of inward corridors coming from common ‘third party’ migration origins.2 
We suggest that this indirect network effect in our results may be driven by learning processes of 
new investment preferences by immigrants from ‘third party’ origins and/or by the presence in 
both countries of second-generation immigrants belonging to the same ethnic group. Moreover, 
the positive effect of the international migration network on bilateral FDI may be due to linkages 
created not only between the origin and destination of migration, but also among countries that are 
the destinations of migration flows from third countries. More immigrants coming from ‘third 
party’ origins may imply more openness and inclusive institutions in both economies, which may 
in turn foster learning processes about investment patterns and therefore more bilateral capital 
exchanges (Fagiolo and Mastrorillo, 2014). 
In this paper, similar to Fagiolo and Mastrorillo (2014), we further test the extent to which binary 
(extensive) vs. weighted (intensive) inward country centrality explain bilateral FDI. Hence, we 
also take into account weighted centrality indicators to further understand the role played by the 
stock of immigrants (intensive migration margins). We find that both forms of migration separately 
2 We use only inward corridors as we believe that outward channels are less relevant in explaining bilateral FDI.  
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increase bilateral FDI. Hence, expanding inward migration corridors and attracting a larger number 
of immigrants separately seem important in increasing FDI. However, when their effects are jointly 
considered, intensive inward centrality outweighs its extensive counterpart, thus indicating that the 
stock of immigrants is more FDI enhancing than the number of inward migration corridors, 
confirming the analogous result found by Fagiolo and Mastrorillo (2014) for bilateral trade.  
Moreover, in order to shed more light on our results and to control that the co-movement of FDI 
and migration flows is not driven by the identification issue that capital investments and migration 
between two countries may be caused by demand shocks we also explore the relationship between 
country 𝑖𝑖’s inward migration from country 𝑗𝑗, and country 𝑖𝑖’s outward FDI to country 𝑗𝑗. We find 
that outward FDI position is again positively affected by inward migration stocks and that the 
result is again enhanced by the FDI-parent country’s in-degree position in the migration network. 
Thus, our results are consistent whether we consider bilateral FDI and migration figures, or we 
focus on the outward FDI and inward migration of the OECD countries.  
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows. The next section briefly reviews the related 
literature. Thereafter, section 3 describes our dataset and visualizes the two networks, while section 
4 presents the topological properties of the two networks. The empirical results are discussed in 
Section 5. Finally, section 6 concludes our analysis. 
 
2 Related Literature 
The literature linking FDI and migration is relatively scarce and usually refers either to within a 
particular country’s migrants affecting bilateral investment with their country-of-birth, or to the 
migrants from a particular country living in a number of other countries affecting capital flows 
between those other countries. The gravity equation model for bilateral trade flows is increasingly 
used to analyze FDI (Wei, 2000; Razin and Sadka, 2007; Blonigen et al. 2007). Bergstrand and 
Egger (2007) and Head and Ries (2008) develop the leading theoretical models that provide 
theoretical micro-foundations for adopting gravity equations for the analysis of FDI. 
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Clemens and Williamson (2000) find that, historically, British foreign capital that flowed into 
countries also attracted a large number of migrants. In the same line, Barry (2002) uses aggregated 
data to show that migration has an impact on inflows of FDI, while Gao (2003) finds that FDI into 
China is positively related to the share of the Chinese population in the FDI-parent country. Hunt 
(2004) finds that migration within Germany often takes the form of same-employer migration and 
Tong (2005) shows that the number of ethnic Chinese in both the FDI-parent and the FDI-host 
country is positively correlated with the cumulative amount of their reciprocal FDI. Kugler and 
Rapoport (2005) find a positive impact of the change in immigrants from a particular origin-
country into the US on outward FDI of US firms into this country. Buch et al. (2006) show that 
there are higher stocks of inward FDI in German states hosting a large foreign population from the 
same country of origin, while Kugler and Rapoport (2007) demonstrate that migration and FDI 
inflows are negatively correlated contemporaneously but migration is associated with an increase 
in future FDI. Bhattacharya and Groznik (2008) find that US outward foreign investment in a 
country is higher the higher the income of the immigrant group from that country living in the US 
is. Furthermore, Ligthart and Singer (2009) investigate the role of immigrants in Dutch outward 
FDI and find that they facilitate outward FDI to their countries of origin. 
More recently, Leblang (2010) tests the hypothesis of whether diaspora networks influence cross-
border investment by reducing transaction and information costs. He uses dyadic cross-sectional 
data for portfolio and FDI and he finds a substantively and statistically significant effect of 
diaspora networks on global investment. Moreover, Javorcik et al. (2011) investigate the link 
between the presence of migrants in the US and US FDI in the migrants’ countries of origin, 
addressing potential endogeneity of migration with respect to FDI by employing the instrumental 
variables approach. They conclude that the presence of migrants in the US increases the volume 
of US FDI in their country of origin. Flisi and Murat (2011) focus on the relation between bilateral 
FDI and skilled and unskilled immigrants and they observe that FDI of UK, Germany and France 
is prompted by the ties of skilled immigrants, while the FDI of Italy and Spain is only influenced 
by their respective diasporas. Finally, Foad (2012) improves identification issues by looking at the 
US-regional distributions of FDI and immigration. Using a unique measure of immigrant network 
size for each US-state, he finds that immigration tends to lead FDI. 
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Regarding the complex-network perspective of our approach, to the best of our knowledge 
although the topological properties of the international migration network and its evolution over 
time has been explored (Fagiolo and Mastrorillo, 2014; Sgrignoli et al., 2015), an investigation of 
the relation between the international migration network and FDI is missing. The current paper not 
only explores the topological properties of the OECD’s outward FDI network but it does so by 
jointly investigating FDI and migration as dependent phenomena i.e. as if they were two fully 
connected layers of the directed-weighted multi-graph where nodes are world countries and links 
represent their macroeconomic interaction channels (Schweitzer et al., 2009).3 
3 Data and Network Visualizations 
This section outlines the data sources on migrant and FDI figures, as well as other explanatory 
variables. A bilateral FDI and bilateral migration panel was constructed for 34 OECD countries 
and up to 185 partner countries for three time periods, totaling 7,625 observations, including FDI 
-zeros.4 Following the relative literature we utilize FDI stocks, as FDI flows are very volatile and 
therefore harder to model. Thus, outward (OECD to partner country) and inward (partner country 
to OECD) FDI positions were sourced from the OECD International Direct Investment Database, 
and are presented in US dollars.5 The OECD countries included in our dataset hosted 71% of 
global inward FDI and were the source of 87% of global outward FDI in 2000 (UNCTAD, 2006). 
Furthermore, we retrieved origin-destination (bilateral) migration data, for all the countries in the 
FDI dataset, from Abel and Sander (2014). The authors quantify international migration flows at 
the country level and present mid-year to mid-year data for four five-year periods, totally spanning 
from 1990 to 2010. The estimates capture the number of people who change their country of 
residence during these periods. In this work, we utilize three time periods, overall spanning from 
1995 to 2010, due to FDI data availability. The fact that Abel and Sander (2014) consider migration 
flows until the half of the last year of every five-year period, allows us to use the five-year 
3 See also Battiston et al. (2007) for a complex-network based analysis of inter-regional investment stocks within 
Europe. 
4 We handle zero-FDI observations by using three alternative approaches which provide qualitatively similar empirical 
results: (a) Poisson estimation (b) Poisson pseudo-maximum likelihood estimation and (c) negative binomial 
estimation. 
5 Details on the data may be found at stats.oecd.org. 
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migration flow estimate as a lagged determinant of the FDI position documented at the end of the 
five-year period. Thus, the structure of Abel and Sander’s (2014) dataset drives the specifics of 
the econometric model used in our analysis, resulting in a pooled panel dataset, which consists of 
three time periods. 
Bilateral FDI stocks can be described by a gravity equation that relates the log of bilateral 
investment to the logged economic sizes of OECD and partner economies and the logged distance 
between them. Thus, in our gravity equation, we include logged values of the GDP per capita and 
population figures for every country pair, taken from the World Development Indicators published 
by the World Bank. We complete the gravity equation by including the log distance between an 
OECD-partner pair, measured as the longitudinal distance in kilometers between the biggest cities 
in the two countries, weighted by the share of the city in the overall country’s population. The 
distance dataset is retrieved by CEPII (see www.cepii.fr). 
In the regression analysis that follows, we also use bilateral country geopolitical and 
socioeconomic data, in order to deal with potential identification issues like cultural similarity, an 
issue not properly addressed by the relevant literature. Cultural similarities could render the 
exchange of migrants and FDI between two partner countries more attractive. The variables used 
to control for this issue are time invariant and are included in CEPII’s geodist dataset. The dataset 
contains information about whether the two countries have ever had a colonial link, share a 
language, or used to be part of the same country. 
We use bilateral FDI positions and bilateral migration data to build two weighted-undirected 
networks wherein for each network, between any two nodes, there is one weighted-undirected link. 
This link describes total bilateral capital movements and bilateral migration respectively. The 
generic element of the international FDI network (IFDIN) records the log of total bilateral FDI 
stocks/positions. I.e., 𝑇𝑇𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖  is the stock of FDI that country 𝑖𝑖 owns in country 𝑗𝑗 plus the stock of 
FDI that country 𝑗𝑗 owns in country 𝑖𝑖 (𝑇𝑇𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 =  𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 +  𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖), where the index 𝑖𝑖 denotes the 34 
OECD countries and the index 𝑗𝑗 denotes 185 countries for which we have FDI data for the years 
2000, 2005 and 2010. On the other hand, the generic element of the international migration 
network (IMN) represents the log of total bilateral migrants, 𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 = 𝑡𝑡𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 + 𝑡𝑡𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖, for every five-
year period. Accordingly, we define the binary projection of the two networks through their 
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adjacency matrices, where their generic elements are equal to one if the corresponding entry in the 
weighted version is strictly positive. 
Similar to Abel and Sander (2014), Figure 1 shows a circular plot visualizing the top 5% of the 
networks’ link weights for both the migration network (panel a) and  the bilateral FDI network 
(panel b) in years 2000, 2005 and 2010. For the migration network, these years refer to the end of 
every five-year period. The size of the circular segments representing individual countries are 
scaled proportionally to the strength of the corresponding country in the respective network. 
In Figure 1a, we see the pronounced role of USA, which is the most important node with respect 
to FDI stock exchange. Other pronounced nodes include large EU economies such as Great Britain, 
France, Germany and the Netherlands. It is therefore evident that the most important capital 
movements emanate from prosperous countries as the highest volume of FDI stock is transferred 
mostly among OECD countries. In comparison, the fraction of non-OECD countries participating 
in the top 5% of FDI stock exchanges is negligible, and it is mostly between these countries and 
the USA. This behavior is consistent across time, even though the network increases in density. 
This means that more capital is exchanged over time, but the lion’s share circulates mostly among 
developed countries. 
As expected, Figure 1b shows that the presence of low-income countries is more pronounced in 
the migration flow network. However, even in this network, the largest flows occur among OECD 
countries. Once more the country with the most prominent role is USA followed by large EU 
countries. It is worth noting, though, that USA is more involved in global migrant flows, while EU 
migration is dominated by internal migration among member states. Similar to the FDI network, 
these observations are stable over time. 
 
8 
 
Figure 1. Circular plot visualizing the FDI Network (a) and the Migration Network (b) in years 
2000, 2005 and 2010. 
 
(a) 
 
(b) 
Notes: Only the top 5% of the networks’ link weights are drawn. The external large blue segment groups together 
OECD countries, while the external green segment non-OECD countries.  Each internal circular segment represents 
an individual country, and its size is proportional to the node strength of this country in the respective network, while 
the width of the flow represents the link weight. 
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4 Descriptive Analysis of the two Networks 
Following Newman (2010), we compute basic descriptive statistics of the two networks across 
time, as shown in Table 1. More precisely, the list of calculated descriptive statistics includes the 
average node degree, the network density, the number of (the weakly) connected components, the 
network diameter and the average path length (APL). These are accompanied by topological 
measures showing structural correlations such as the assortativity coefficient and the network 
transitivity (or clustering coefficient). Comparing the topological properties of the two networks 
across time we find that the migration network is much denser that the FDI network. However, the 
FDI network has almost doubled its density from 2000 to 2010, while the density of the migration 
network remained at the same level. Both networks are connected and have relatively small 
diameter and APL, which indicates the presence of small world properties. In this respect, the 
migration network features a more pronounced small-world property with a smaller average path 
length than in the FDI network. However, the APL value of the migration network remained almost 
stable over the three examined periods, while on the other hand the APL of the FDI network has 
decreased. Furthermore, the global clustering coefficient (transitivity) is always larger in the 
migration network, even though over the years a measurable increasing trend for the FDI network 
is observed. This implies that countries in the migration network have a higher tendency to form 
clusters i.e. if there are migration flows between countries (A,B), and (B,C), then there is a high 
probability for migration flows between countries (A,C). In addition, the (strong) negative 
assortativity coefficients we find for both networks indicate that, as it is expected, capital and 
migration relationships occur mostly between countries with different degree centralities.  
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Table 1. Descriptive Network Statistics 
  2000   2005   2010 
 IFDIN IMN  IFDIN IMN  IFDIN IMN 
No. Nodes 169 185  180 185  183 185 
Mean degree 9.480 47.892  13.733 47.524  18.197 47.286 
Density 0.056 0.260  0.077 0.258  0.099 0.257 
APL (undirected) 2.013 1.740  1.973 1.742  1.901 1.743 
No. WCC 1 1  1 1  1 1 
Diameter 4 3  4 2  3 3 
Assortativity -0.518 -0.755  -0.563 -0.757  -0.567 -0.767 
Transitivity 0.246 0.410   0.258 0.411   0.315 0.398 
         
Notes: IFDIN: International FDI Network; IMN: International Migration Network; APL: Average Path Length; WCC: 
Weakly connected components. 
 
Further network similarities are studied by exploring link weights’ correlation. In Figure 2 we 
provide a scatter plot of the link weights in the FDI network against the link weights in the 
migration network (log scale) for the year 2005. Note that a stronger link-weight in the FDI 
network is typically associated with a stronger migration link-weight, and that this positive relation 
is explained by countries’ economic sizes, demographic sizes and geographic distances (note that 
in Figure 2, markers’ size is proportional to the logged product of country populations divided by 
country distance. Colors scale -from lighter to darker- is from lower to higher values of the logged 
product of countries’ per capita GDPs divided by country distance), stimulating the adoption of a 
gravity-like equation in the next section.    
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Figure 2. International migration network (IMN) versus international FDI network (IFDIN) link 
weights in year 2005 
 
 
 
Notes: Logarithmic scale. Markers’ size is proportional to the logged product of country populations divided by 
country distance. Colors scale (from lighter to darker) is from lower to higher values of the logged product of 
countries’ per capita GDPs divided by country distance. 
 
Finalizing our descriptive network analysis, we compute the correlations between the two 
networks’ node-statistics for the year 2005. Panel (a) in Figure 3 indicates that node strengths are 
positively and linearly correlated in the two networks. This finding can be explained by countries’ 
economic and demographic differences (note again that in Figure 3, markers’ size is proportional 
to the logged product of country populations divided by country distance. Colors scale -from 
lighter to darker- is from lower to higher values of the logged product of countries’ per capita 
GDPs divided by country distance), and it means that the more a country foreign invests the larger 
the immigrant stocks it holds. Panel (b) indicates that Average Nearest Neighbor Strength (ANNS) 
is positively correlated in the two networks implying that if a country is FDI connected to a country 
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that in turn is highly FDI connected with third-party countries, it will also be migration-connected 
to countries that hold a lot of migration stocks. Again, demographic and economic country 
characteristics are associated with the above finding but now in a different manner, namely, 
countries with larger levels of ANNS are smaller and poorer. The above findings motivate the 
inclusion of network variables, as additional controls, in next section’s gravity equation. 
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Figure 3. Correlation of node network statistics between international migration network (IMN) and international FDI network (IFDIN) 
in year 2005. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                            (a)                                                                (b) 
 
Notes: Panel (a): Total strength; Panel (b): Average Nearest-Neighbor Strength (ANNS); Markers’ size is proportional to logs of population; Colors scale (from 
lighter to darker) is from lower to higher (logged) values of GDP per capita. 
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5 Empirical Analysis 
In this section, we combine the panel dataset on international migration flows from Abel and 
Sander (2014) with data on FDI in order to provide an empirical study of the relationship 
between the two networks. We use a gravity model approach, while controlling for network 
effects. We first test if the networks of international migration and FDI are correlated. Then we 
ask whether pairs of countries that are more central in the migration network exchange more 
capital. Finally, we investigate whether bilateral FDI is further affected by the complex web of 
‘third party’ corridors of the international migration network (Table 2). Moreover, in order to 
control that the co-movement of FDI and migration flows is not driven by the identification 
issue that capital investments and migration into a FDI-host country may be caused by a 
demand shock in the FDI-parent country, we additionally estimate only the one direction of 
migration -the opposite one to FDI-, namely, the effect of inward migration on outward FDI 
(Table 3).  
Our empirical analysis starts with the recognition of the much-discussed issue -in the relevant 
literature- of zero-FDI values. Previous studies have used Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) to 
investigate the empirical relationship between FDI and its determinants (Chakrabati, 2001). 
However, this method may be inappropriate for analyzing the count number of FDI, as it 
assumes that the dependent variable follows a normal distribution. In the case of FDI, (a) the 
dependent variable cannot be negative and (b) there are many zero counts due to some countries 
not receiving any FDI at all; hence, the dependent variable is not normally distributed. To deal 
with count data we estimate the following baseline equation, using the framework of Poisson 
regression model with robust standard errors, country 𝑖𝑖, country 𝑗𝑗 fixed effects as well as time 
fixed effects6: 
 log (𝑇𝑇𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖) = 𝛼𝛼1log (𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖−1) + 𝛼𝛼2log(𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖−1) + 𝑎𝑎3log(𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑡𝑡𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖−1)+ 𝑎𝑎4log(𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑡𝑡𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖−1) + 𝑎𝑎5log (𝑝𝑝𝑖𝑖𝑑𝑑𝑡𝑡𝑑𝑑𝑝𝑝𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖) + 𝑎𝑎6𝑙𝑙𝑎𝑎𝑙𝑙𝑡𝑡𝑙𝑙𝑎𝑎𝑡𝑡𝑑𝑑𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 + 𝑎𝑎7𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑙𝑙𝑝𝑝𝑙𝑙𝑐𝑐𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖+ 𝑎𝑎8𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑙𝑙45𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 + 𝑎𝑎9𝑑𝑑𝑡𝑡𝑝𝑝𝑡𝑡𝑠𝑠𝑐𝑐𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 + 𝛽𝛽log (𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖−1) + 𝛾𝛾1𝑖𝑖𝑙𝑙𝑝𝑝𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖−1𝑏𝑏 + 𝛾𝛾1′𝑖𝑖𝑙𝑙𝑝𝑝𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖−1𝑤𝑤+ 𝛾𝛾2𝑝𝑝𝑜𝑜𝑑𝑑𝑠𝑠𝑖𝑖𝑙𝑙𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖−1𝑏𝑏 + 𝛾𝛾2′𝑝𝑝𝑜𝑜𝑑𝑑𝑠𝑠𝑖𝑖𝑙𝑙𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖−1𝑤𝑤 + 𝑝𝑝1 + 𝑝𝑝𝑖𝑖 + 𝑝𝑝𝑖𝑖 + 𝑝𝑝𝑖𝑖 +  𝜀𝜀𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖  
6 The basic idea of the Poisson regression was outlined by Coleman (1964, 378-379). An early example of Poisson 
regression was Cochran (1940). See McNeil (1996), Long (1997), Selvin (2004) Johnson et al. (2005), Selvin 
(2011), Long and Freese (2014) and Cameron and Trivedi (2013) for textbook treatments and Allison (2009) for 
an extensive discussion on these models.  
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                                                                                                                                                                   (1) 
where 𝑇𝑇𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 is the total bilateral FDI stocks at time t (years 2000, 2005, 2010) defined as 
𝑇𝑇𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 =  𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 +  𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 ; 𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖−1 , 𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖−1  and 𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑡𝑡𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖−1 ,  𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑡𝑡𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖−1  are countries’ 
population and GDP per capita respectively, at time 𝑡𝑡 − 1  (years 1999, 2004, 2009). 
𝑝𝑝𝑖𝑖𝑑𝑑𝑡𝑡𝑑𝑑𝑝𝑝𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 is longitudinal distance in kilometers between the biggest cities in countries 𝑖𝑖 and 
𝑗𝑗, weighted by the share of the city in the overall country’s population. Moreover, the dummy 
variables introduced indicate whether the two countries share a language spoken by at least 9% 
of the population in both countries (𝑙𝑙𝑎𝑎𝑙𝑙𝑡𝑡𝑙𝑙𝑎𝑎𝑡𝑡𝑑𝑑𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖), have ever had a colonial link (𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑙𝑙𝑝𝑝𝑙𝑙𝑐𝑐𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖) or 
a colonial relationship after 1945 (𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑙𝑙45𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖) and used to be part of the same country (𝑑𝑑𝑡𝑡𝑝𝑝𝑡𝑡𝑠𝑠𝑐𝑐𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖). 
𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖−1 is the total bilateral migration stock at time 𝑡𝑡 − 1, defined as 𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖−1 = 𝑡𝑡𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖−1 +
𝑡𝑡𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖−1. 7 𝑖𝑖𝑙𝑙𝑝𝑝𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖−1𝑏𝑏  (resp. 𝑖𝑖𝑙𝑙𝑝𝑝𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖−1𝑤𝑤 ) is a binary (resp. weighted) centrality indicator measuring 
the total in-degree centralization, constructed as the logged sum of inward (resp. weighted) 
links of country 𝑖𝑖  and the inward (resp. weighted) links of country 𝑗𝑗 . 𝑝𝑝𝑜𝑜𝑑𝑑𝑠𝑠𝑖𝑖𝑙𝑙𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖−1𝑏𝑏  (resp. 
𝑝𝑝𝑜𝑜𝑑𝑑𝑠𝑠𝑖𝑖𝑙𝑙𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖−1
𝑤𝑤 ) captures the effect of third-country common inward migration channels and it is 
constructed as the logged sum of inward (resp. weighted) links of country 𝑖𝑖 and inward (resp. 
weighted) links of country 𝑗𝑗  originated from common third country 𝑘𝑘 . Thus, the variable 
𝑝𝑝𝑜𝑜𝑑𝑑𝑠𝑠𝑖𝑖𝑙𝑙𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖−1
𝑏𝑏  (resp. 𝑝𝑝𝑜𝑜𝑑𝑑𝑠𝑠𝑖𝑖𝑙𝑙𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖−1𝑤𝑤 ) sums up only the commonly-shared (overlapping) inward 
migration (resp. weighted) links originated from third countries 𝑘𝑘 , while 𝑖𝑖𝑙𝑙𝑝𝑝𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖−1𝑏𝑏  (resp. 
𝑖𝑖𝑙𝑙𝑝𝑝𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖−1
𝑤𝑤 ) sums up the total inward migration (weighted) links (overlapping and non-
overlapping). 𝑝𝑝1  is a constant, 𝑝𝑝𝑖𝑖, 𝑝𝑝𝑖𝑖 , 𝑝𝑝𝑖𝑖  are OECD country, partner country and time fixed 
effects, respectively. Finally, 𝜀𝜀𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖  is the error term. Notice that we lag all the time varying 
independent variables, in order to address possible issues of reverse causality. 
We further examine the relationship between the two networks by replacing in equation (1) the 
total bilateral FDI positions (𝑇𝑇𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖) with the outward FDI position of country 𝑖𝑖 in country 𝑗𝑗 
and the total bilateral migration stock (𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖) with the stock of migrants originated from 
country 𝑗𝑗 (FDI-host country) and present in country 𝑖𝑖 (FDI-parent country), demonstrating that 
our empirical results on capital and people co-movements between two countries are not driven 
by a demand shock. 𝑖𝑖𝑙𝑙𝑝𝑝𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖−1𝑏𝑏  (resp. 𝑖𝑖𝑙𝑙𝑝𝑝𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖−1𝑤𝑤 ) is a binary (resp. weighted) centrality indicator 
7 Abel and Sander’s, 2014, bilateral migration flows for the five-year periods: mid1995-mid2000, mid2000-
mid2005 and mid2005-mid2010. 
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constructed as the log in-degree centralization of the FDI-parent country i.e. log value of total 
inward (resp. weighted) links of country 𝑖𝑖. Thus, our second specification is: 
 log (𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖) = 𝛼𝛼�1log (𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖−1) + 𝛼𝛼�2log(𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖−1) + 𝑎𝑎�3log(𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑡𝑡𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖−1) + 𝑎𝑎�4log(𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑡𝑡𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖−1)+ 𝑎𝑎�5log (𝑝𝑝𝑖𝑖𝑑𝑑𝑡𝑡𝑑𝑑𝑝𝑝𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖) + 𝑎𝑎�6𝑙𝑙𝑎𝑎𝑙𝑙𝑡𝑡𝑙𝑙𝑎𝑎𝑡𝑡𝑑𝑑𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 + 𝑎𝑎�7𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑙𝑙𝑝𝑝𝑙𝑙𝑐𝑐𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 + 𝑎𝑎�8𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑙𝑙45𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖+ 𝑎𝑎�9𝑑𝑑𝑡𝑡𝑝𝑝𝑡𝑡𝑠𝑠𝑐𝑐𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 + 𝛽𝛽�log (𝑡𝑡𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖−1) + 𝛾𝛾�𝑖𝑖𝑙𝑙𝑝𝑝𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖−1𝑏𝑏 + 𝛾𝛾�′𝑖𝑖𝑙𝑙𝑝𝑝𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖−1𝑤𝑤 + ?̃?𝑝1 + ?̃?𝑝𝑖𝑖 + ?̃?𝑝𝑖𝑖 + ?̃?𝑝𝑖𝑖+ 𝜀𝜀?̃?𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖                                                                                                                                                                     (2)
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Table 2. Poisson Regression Results (Total FDI and Total Migration) 
  (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6) 
             
𝑙𝑙𝑝𝑝𝑡𝑡(𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑖𝑖)  (-5.361***)  (-5.027***)  (-5.524***)  (-5.528***)  (-5.285***)  (-5.376***) 
  -(1.411)***  -(1.411)***  -(1.404)***  -(1.410)***  -(1.412)***  -(1.416)*** 
𝑙𝑙𝑝𝑝𝑡𝑡�𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑖𝑖�  (-0.099***)  (-0.160***)  (-0.707***)  (-0.706***)  (-0.139***)  (-0.300***) 
  -(0.322)***  -(0.322)***  -(0.318)***  -(0.318)***  -(0.214)***  -(0.321)*** 
𝑙𝑙𝑝𝑝𝑡𝑡(𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑡𝑡𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑖𝑖)  (-0.572***)  (-0.693***)  (-0.613***)  (-0.612***)  (-0.598***)  (-0.595***) 
  -(0.214)***  -(0.215)***  -(0.211)***  -(0.214)***  -(0.214)***  -(0.213)*** 
𝑙𝑙𝑝𝑝𝑡𝑡�𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑡𝑡𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑖𝑖�  (-0.272***)  (-0.198***)  (-0.270***)  (-0.271***)  (-0.228***)  (-0.171***) 
  -(0.102)***  -(0.104)***  -(0.099)***  -(0.102)***  -(0.105)***  -(0.101)*** 
𝑙𝑙𝑝𝑝𝑡𝑡�𝑝𝑝𝑖𝑖𝑑𝑑𝑡𝑡𝑑𝑑𝑝𝑝𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖�  (-0.316***)  (-0.326***)  (-0.300***)  (-0.300***)  (-0.306***)  (-0.290***) 
  -(0.041)***  -(0.041)***  -(0.041)***  -(0.041)***  -(0.041)***  -(0.041)*** 
𝑙𝑙𝑎𝑎𝑙𝑙𝑡𝑡𝑙𝑙𝑎𝑎𝑡𝑡𝑑𝑑𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖   (-0.066***)  (-0.066***)  (-0.079***)  (-0.079***)  (-0.065***)  (-0.066***) 
  -(0.038)***  -(0.038)***  -(0.037)***  -(0.037)***  -(0.038)***  -(0.038)*** 
𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑙𝑙𝑝𝑝𝑙𝑙𝑐𝑐𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖   (-0.170***)  (-0.168***)  (-0.190***)  (-0.190***)  (-0.168***)  (-0.172***) 
  -(0.047)***  -(0.047)***  -(0.044)***  -(0.044)***  -(0.047)***  -(0.046)*** 
𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑙𝑙45𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖   (-0.244***)  (-0.242***)  (-0.158***)  (-0.158***)  (-0.242***)  (-0.208***) 
  -(0.077)***  -(0.076)***  -(0.075)***  -(0.075)***  -(0.077)***  -(0.076)*** 
𝑑𝑑𝑡𝑡𝑝𝑝𝑡𝑡𝑠𝑠𝑐𝑐𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖   (-0.256***)  (-0.256***)  (-0.314***)  (-0.314***)  (-0.258***)  (-0.280***) 
  -(0.100)***  -(0.100)***  -(0.101)***  -(0.101)***  -(0.100)***  -(0.099)*** log (𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖)  (-0.128***)  (-0.126***)  (-0.127***)  (-0.127***)  (-0.132***)  (-0.134***) 
  -(0.014)***  -(0.014)***  -(0.014)***  -(0.014)***  -(0.014)***  -(0.014)*** 
𝑖𝑖𝑙𝑙𝑝𝑝𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖
𝑏𝑏     (-0.674***)    (-0.007***)     
    -(0.183)***    -(0.179)***     
𝑖𝑖𝑙𝑙𝑝𝑝𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖
𝑤𝑤    )  (-0.684***)  (-0.684***)     
      -(0.044)***  -(0.045)***     
𝑝𝑝𝑜𝑜𝑑𝑑𝑠𝑠𝑖𝑖𝑙𝑙𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖
𝑏𝑏           (-0.106***)   
          -(0.050)***   
𝑝𝑝𝑜𝑜𝑑𝑑𝑠𝑠𝑖𝑖𝑙𝑙𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖
𝑤𝑤             (-0.193***) 
            -(0.030)*** 
             
Fixed Effects  Country 𝑖𝑖 / country 𝑗𝑗 / Time 
             
𝑃𝑃𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑙𝑙𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝 𝑅𝑅2  0.435  0.436  0.444  0.444  0.436  0.438 
𝑊𝑊𝑎𝑎𝑙𝑙𝑝𝑝 𝑋𝑋2  8827.650  8820.880  8797.950  8801.260  8825.720  8901.490 
  [0.000]  [0.000]  [0.000]  [0.000]  [0.000]  [0.000] 
Log Pseudolikelihood  -16654.228  -16640.930  -16402.637  -16402.636  -16649.300  -16560.512 
No of Observations  7625  7625  7625  7625  7625  7625 
Notes: Dependent Variable: log (𝑇𝑇𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖). Independent Variables: see text. Poisson regressions are estimated with country 𝑖𝑖,  country 
𝑗𝑗 and time fixed effects. Numbers in parentheses are robust standard errors; p-values in brackets. The symbols *, ** and *** reveal 
statistical significance at 10%, 5% and 1% respectively. 
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 Table 3. Poisson Regression Results (Outward FDI and Inward Migration) 
  (1)  (2)   (3)   (4) 
           
𝑙𝑙𝑝𝑝𝑡𝑡(𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑖𝑖)  (-3.553***)  (-3.516***)   (-4.059***)   (-4.108***) 
  -(1.059)***  -(1.061)***   -(1.069)***   -(1.074)*** 
𝑙𝑙𝑝𝑝𝑡𝑡�𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑖𝑖�  (-0.021***)  (-0.023***)   (-0.016***)   (-0.014***) 
  -(0.275)***  -(0.274)***   -(0.273)***   -(0.273)*** 
𝑙𝑙𝑝𝑝𝑡𝑡(𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑡𝑡𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑖𝑖)  (-0.151***)  (-0.168***)   (-0.225***)   (-0.209***) 
  -(0.189)***  -(0.196)***   -(0.189)***   -(0.195)*** 
𝑙𝑙𝑝𝑝𝑡𝑡�𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑡𝑡𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑖𝑖�  (-0.351***)  (-0.349***)   (-0.339***)   (-0.340***) 
  -(0.090)***  -(0.090)***   -(0.089)***   -(0.089)*** 
𝑙𝑙𝑝𝑝𝑡𝑡�𝑝𝑝𝑖𝑖𝑑𝑑𝑡𝑡𝑑𝑑𝑝𝑝𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖�  (-0.396***)  (-0.397***)   (-0.402***)   (-0.401***) 
  -(0.031)***  -(0.031)***   -(0.031)***   -(0.031)*** 
𝑙𝑙𝑎𝑎𝑙𝑙𝑡𝑡𝑙𝑙𝑎𝑎𝑡𝑡𝑑𝑑𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖   (-0.128***)  (-0.128***)   (-0.131***)   (-0.131***) 
  -(0.031)***  -(0.031)***   -(0.031)***   -(0.031)*** 
𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑙𝑙𝑝𝑝𝑙𝑙𝑐𝑐𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖   (-0.107***)  (-0.107***)   (-0.106***)   (-0.106***) 
  -(0.039)***  -(0.039)***   -(0.039)***   -(0.039)*** 
𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑙𝑙45𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖   (-0.361***)  (-0.361***)   (-0.366***)   (-0.366***) 
  -(0.064)***  -(0.064)***   -(0.064)***   -(0.064)*** 
𝑑𝑑𝑡𝑡𝑝𝑝𝑡𝑡𝑠𝑠𝑐𝑐𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖   (-0.271***)  (-0.271***)   (-0.266***)   (-0.269***) 
  -(0.082)***  -(0.082)***   -(0.082)***   -(0.082)*** log (𝑡𝑡𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖)  (-0.068***)  (-0.068***)   (-0.063***)   (-0.063***) 
  -(0.007)***  -(0.007)***   -(0.007)***   -(0.007)*** 
𝑖𝑖𝑙𝑙𝑝𝑝𝑖𝑖
𝑏𝑏    (-0.069***)      (-0.073***) 
    -(0.156)***      -(0.157)*** 
𝑖𝑖𝑙𝑙𝑝𝑝𝑖𝑖
𝑤𝑤       (-0.253***)   (-0.258***) 
       -(0.059)***   -(0.059)*** 
  
Fixed Effects Country 𝑖𝑖 / country 𝑗𝑗 / Time 
           
𝑃𝑃𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑙𝑙𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝 𝑅𝑅2  0.421  0.421   0.422   0.422 
𝑊𝑊𝑎𝑎𝑙𝑙𝑝𝑝 𝑋𝑋2  10874.940  10879.050   10852.860   10856.780 
  [0.000]  [0.000]   [0.000]   [0.000] 
Log Pseudolikelihood  -22307.427  -22307.293   -22293.201   -22293.058 
No of Observations  9938  9938   9938   9938 
Notes: Dependent Variable: log (𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖). Independent Variables: see text. Poisson regressions are estimated 
with country 𝑖𝑖,  country 𝑗𝑗 and time fixed effects. Numbers in parentheses are robust standard errors; p-values 
in brackets. The symbols *, ** and *** reveal statistical significance at 10%, 5% and 1% respectively. 
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Note that from equation (1) the bilateral migration stocks in a pair of countries is found to be 
related with increased bilateral foreign direct investments. Respectively, from equation (2) we 
find that the migration stocks originated from country 𝑗𝑗 and present in country 𝑖𝑖 are associated 
with increased capital investments of country 𝑖𝑖 in country 𝑗𝑗. Thus, we confirm the related 
literature’s finding that migrant diasporas indeed contribute to attracting investment. The 
impact of the control variables is in most cases strong, significant and signed as expected. 
Variables like the populations of countries in both specifications and the GDP per capita of 
country 𝑖𝑖  in the first specification, initially raise concerns about their lack of statistical 
significance and their signs. However, a thorough examination reveals that when we do not 
include country fixed effects, the variables are statistically significant and positively signed. 
Thus, a possible explanation is that the inclusion of fixed effects absorbs the effects of these 
variables, while the negative coefficients pick up population growth and per capita GDP, which 
may be correlated with poor institutional quality, causing a negative coefficient.8 
A supplementary contribution of this paper is the inclusion of the network variables as 
additional control variables in the gravity equations. Our results show that bilateral foreign 
direct investments between any two countries is not only affected by the presence of migrants 
from either countries, but also by their relative embeddedness in the complex web of corridors 
making up the network of international human migration. The positive sign and the statistical 
significance of the network variables in the first econometric specification strongly suggest 
that bilateral FDI increases, the more the two countries under consideration are inward central 
in the international migration network. Interestingly, inward migrants coming from common 
‘third party’ corridors are FDI enhancing. We argue that our results may be driven either by 
learning processes of new investment preferences by migrants whose origins are shared by the 
two countries or by the presence in both countries of second-generation migrants belonging to 
the same ethnic group. Our findings indicate that migration networks are conductive to bilateral 
investment because they create linkages not only between pairs of countries that are the origin 
and destination of migration, but also among countries that are the destinations of migration 
flows originated from common third countries (Fagiolo and Mastrorillo, 2014). 
The estimation of equation (2), when only the effect of inward migration on outward FDI is 
considered, reveals the consistency of our results and shows that the network weighted variable 
has again a positive and statistically significant effect on outward FDI but its binary counterpart 
8 The estimated results without the country fixed effects are available upon request. 
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is statistically insignificant. This implies that the more inward-migration stocks the FDI-parent 
country holds, the higher its foreign capital investments to the migration-origin country. 
We also test whether our findings remain intact when considering the intensive form of 
centrality into the IMN i.e. weighted inward country centrality (Table 2). As expected, both 
extensive and intensive inward centralities separately boost bilateral FDI (columns 2 and 3; 
columns 5 and 6). Column 4 also depicts the case where extensive and intensive inward 
centralities are jointly considered in the Poisson regression. It is clear that the coefficient of the 
extensive form loses its importance in explaining bilateral FDI, indicating that intensive inward 
centrality has no effect on bilateral FDI. Therefore, confirming the analogous result found by 
Fagiolo and Mastrorillo (2014) for bilateral trade, it seems that intensive centrality in the IMN 
outweighs extensive centrality, i.e. bilateral FDI seems to be boosted more by the number of 
immigrants than by the number of inward corridors held by any two countries in the IMN.  
As a robustness check of our results, we also consider a Poisson estimation by pseudo-
maximum likelihood (PML). It differs from the Poisson regression because it uses the method 
of  Santos Silva and Tenreyro (2010) to identify and drop regressors that may cause the non-
existence of the (pseudo) maximum likelihood estimates. In our case, the results from this 
specification are identical to those of the Poisson regressions (Table 2). We also consider a 
negative binomial regression (Hausman et al., 1984) as an additional robustness check. Table 
4 presents the results, which remain qualitatively intact to this alternative technique. Hence, it 
seems that our findings remain robust to alternative estimation models.   
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Table 4. Robustness checks: Negative Binomial (NB) 
  (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6) 
             
𝑙𝑙𝑝𝑝𝑡𝑡(𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑖𝑖)  (-7.343***)  (-6.852***)  (-7.283***)  (-7.320***)  (-7.216***)  (-7.037***) 
  -(1.820)***  -(1.817)***  -(1.815)***  -(1.821)***  -(1.819)***  -(1.811)*** 
𝑙𝑙𝑝𝑝𝑡𝑡�𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑖𝑖�  (-0.148***)  (-0.213***)  (-0.937***)  (-0.936***)  (-0.196***)  (-0.493***) 
  -(0.424)***  -(0.424)***  -(0.423)***  -(0.423)***  -(0.425)***  -(0.424)*** 
𝑙𝑙𝑝𝑝𝑡𝑡(𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑡𝑡𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑖𝑖)  (-0.784***)  (-0.953***)  (-0.850***)  (-0.840***)  (-0.818***)  (-0.845***) 
  -(0.284)***  -(0.286)***  -(0.278)***  -(0.283)***  -(0.284)***  -(0.277)*** 
𝑙𝑙𝑝𝑝𝑡𝑡�𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑡𝑡𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑖𝑖�  (-0.354***)  (-0.262***)  (-0.347***)  (-0.353***)  (-0.303***)  (-0.231***) 
  -(0.130)***  -(0.133)***  -(0.126)***  -(0.129)***  -(0.133)***  -(0.128)*** 
𝑙𝑙𝑝𝑝𝑡𝑡�𝑝𝑝𝑖𝑖𝑑𝑑𝑡𝑡𝑑𝑑𝑝𝑝𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖�  (-0.302***)  (-0.315***)  (-0.290***)  (-0.299***)  (-0.291***)  (-0.261***) 
  -(0.050)***  -(0.050)***  -(0.050)***  -(0.050)***  -(0.050)***  -(0.049)*** 
𝑙𝑙𝑎𝑎𝑙𝑙𝑡𝑡𝑙𝑙𝑎𝑎𝑡𝑡𝑑𝑑𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖   (-0.090***)  (-0.089***)  (-0.103***)  (-0.103***)  (-0.089***)  (-0.091***) 
  -(0.047)***  -(0.047)***  -(0.046)***  -(0.046)***  -(0.047)***  -(0.047)*** 
𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑙𝑙𝑝𝑝𝑙𝑙𝑐𝑐𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖   (-0.184***)  (-0.184***)  (-0.218***)  (-0.218***)  (-0.182***)  (-0.192***) 
  -(0.056)***  -(0.056)***  -(0.053)***  -(0.053)***  -(0.056)***  -(0.054)*** 
𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑙𝑙45𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖   (-0.192***)  (-0.187***)  (-0.071***)  (-0.071***)  (-0.193***)  (-0.133***) 
  -(0.096)***  -(0.096)***  -(0.093)***  -(0.093)***  -(0.096)***  -(0.094)*** 
𝑑𝑑𝑡𝑡𝑝𝑝𝑡𝑡𝑠𝑠𝑐𝑐𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖   (-0.267***)  (-0.269***)  (-0.373***)  (-0.374***)  (-0.269***)  (-0.319***) 
  -(0.125)***  -(0.125)***  -(0.129)***  -(0.129)***  -(0.125)***  -(0.124)*** log (𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖)  (-0.162***)  (-0.159***)  (-0.154***)  (-0.154***)  (-0.165***)  (-0.169***) 
  -(0.018)***  -(0.018)***  -(0.018)***  -(0.018)***  -(0.018)***  -(0.018)*** 
𝑖𝑖𝑙𝑙𝑝𝑝𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖
𝑏𝑏     (-0.815***)    (-0.056***)     
    -(0.233)***    -(0.227)***     
𝑖𝑖𝑙𝑙𝑝𝑝𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖
𝑤𝑤    )  (-0.875***)  (-0.878***)     
      -(0.057)***  -(0.058)***     
𝑝𝑝𝑜𝑜𝑑𝑑𝑠𝑠𝑖𝑖𝑙𝑙𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖
𝑏𝑏           (-0.123***)   
          -(0.067)***   
𝑝𝑝𝑜𝑜𝑑𝑑𝑠𝑠𝑖𝑖𝑙𝑙𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖
𝑤𝑤             (-0.315***) 
            -(0.053)*** 
             
Fixed Effects  Country 𝑖𝑖 / country 𝑗𝑗 / Time 
             
𝑃𝑃𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑙𝑙𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝 𝑅𝑅2  0.230  0.231  0.236  0.236  0.230  0.233 
𝑊𝑊𝑎𝑎𝑙𝑙𝑝𝑝 𝑋𝑋2  9259.990  9260.710  9213.650  9221.930  9257.880  9295.02 
  [0.000]  [0.000]  [0.000]  [0.000]  [0.000]  [0.000] 
Log Pseudolikelihood  -13648.292  -13642.922  -13537.954  -13537.930  -13646.644  -13601.423 
No of Observations  7625  7625  7625  7625  7625  7625 
Notes: Dependent Variable: log (𝑇𝑇𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖). Independent Variables: see text. Negative binomial regressions are estimated with country 
𝑖𝑖,  country 𝑗𝑗 and time fixed effects. Numbers in parentheses are robust standard errors; p-values in brackets. The symbols *, ** and 
*** reveal statistical significance at 10%, 5% and 1% respectively. 
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6 Conclusions 
Throughout the world, economies are becoming rapidly integrated and the level of dependence 
between them increases substantially. Globalization has led to a rapid growth in the flow of 
factors of production across borders. From 1980 to 2010, there has been an increase of about 
65 million in the foreign population in the OECD countries, while the volume of FDI grew four 
times as fast as world output during the same period. The international flow of people and 
capital are important features of this integrated global economy and taken together, the 
international investment channels and the migration corridors constitute a convoluted and 
complicated web of relationships among countries. 
This paper has explored the properties and the link between migration and FDI, using a gravity 
model enriched with complex-network effects. Diasporas in the OECD attract FDI to their 
origin countries and this result can be mostly explained by countries’ economic, demographic 
and geographic characteristics. Our main findings though suggest that bilateral FDI increases 
the more inward central in the migration network pairs of countries are. Moreover, migrants 
originated from overlapping ‘third party’ countries can be FDI enhancing. We have also found 
that outward FDI is positively associated to inward migration: migrants in country 𝑗𝑗 originated 
from country 𝑖𝑖 attract FDI in their origin country 𝑖𝑖 from destination country 𝑗𝑗. Interestingly, 
our results indicate that the larger the diversity of migration channels and the stock of 
immigrants from ‘third-party’ origins towards any two countries that are FDI connected, the 
higher the stock of foreign capital in the FDI-host country originated from the FDI-parent 
country. Our findings remain robust to alternative count data estimation techniques. 
With our work we add to the present literature an exploratory analysis, which highlights the 
existence of previously unexplored sources of influence in the relation between FDI and 
migration. Furthermore, we do believe that there is space for additional improvement of this 
approach. Particularly, we suggest an examination of a wide set of immigrant characteristics 
which, along with network variables could provide further insight on the relationship between 
human migration and FDI. Higher frequency of the migration data should also provide a 
considerable improvement for future studies since so far migration datasets are based on 
censuses conducted every ten years, while FDI data are updated annually, creating a frequency 
mismatch. Finally, the focus on the current paper was placed on direct investment that generally 
builds on a wide network of economic agents, requiring a long-run focus on the characteristics 
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of the host country. Thus, the examination of how human migration affects short-term portfolio 
investment flows could provide us with interesting results. 
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